

Aikhenvald, *Evidentiality*, OUP 2004.

Chapter 1. Preliminaries, and key concepts

No two languages are entirely the same, nor are they entirely different. It is as if there was a universal inventory of possible grammatical and lexical categories and each language makes a different set of choices from this inventory. As Franz Boas (a founding father of modern linguistics) put it, languages differ not in what one can say but in what kind of information must be stated: 'grammar [...] determines those aspects of each experience that *must* be expressed' (Boas 1938: 132). One language may have a two-term gender system, while another has five genders and a third makes no gender distinctions at all in its grammar. Along similar lines, some languages have grammatical tense, and others do not.

In about a quarter of the world's languages, every statement must specify the type of source on which it is based — for example, whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else. This grammatical category, whose primary meaning is information source, is called 'evidentiality'. In Boas' (1938: 133) words, 'while for us definiteness, number, and time are obligatory aspects, we find in another language location near the speaker or somewhere else, [and] source of information — whether seen, heard, or inferred — as obligatory aspects'.

1.1 Evidentiality: an illustration

Marking one's information source indicates how one learnt something. Languages vary in how many types of information sources they have to express. Many just mark information reported by someone else. Others distinguish firsthand and non-firsthand sources. In rarer instances, visually obtained data are contrasted with data obtained through hearing or smelling, or through various

kinds of inference. These larger systems also tend to have a separate marker for reported information. Tariana, an Arawak language spoken in the multilingual area of the Vaupés in Northwest Amazonia, has an even more complex system. In this language, one cannot simply say 'José played football'. Just like in all other indigenous languages from the same area, speakers have to specify whether they saw the event happen, or heard it, or know about it because somebody else told them, etc. This is achieved through a set of evidential markers fused with tense. Omitting an evidential results in an ungrammatical and highly unnatural sentence.

If one saw José play football, 1.1 would be appropriate (here and elsewhere evidential morphemes are in bold type), with *-ka* marking both visual evidential and recent past tense:

Tariana

1.1 Juse i|ida di-manika-**ka**
 José football 3sgnf-play-REC.P.VIS
 'José has played football (we saw it)'

If one just heard the noise of a football game but could not see what is happening, 1.2 is the thing to say. Here, *-mahka* marks non-visual evidential and recent past.

Tariana

1.2 Juse i|ida di-manika-**mahka**
 José football 3sgnf-play-REC.P.NONVIS
 'José has played football (we heard it)'

If one sees that the football is not in its normal place in the house, and José and his football boots are gone (and his sandals are left behind), with crowds of people coming back from the football ground, this is enough for us to infer that José is playing football. We then say 1.3, where *-nihka* marks inferred evidentiality and recent past tense.

Tariana

1.3 Juse i|ida di-manika-**nihka**
 José football 3sgnf-play-REC.P.INFR
 'José has played football (we infer it from visual evidence)'

Suppose José is not at home on a Sunday afternoon. We know that he usually plays football on Sunday afternoon. Then, 1.4 is an option. Our assumption here is based on general knowledge about José's habits, with *-sika* marking assumed evidentiality and recent past tense:

Tariana

1.4 Juse i|ida di-manika-**sika**
 José football 3sgnf-play-REC.P.ASSUM
 'José played football (we assume this on the basis of what we already know)'

The difference between the 'assumed' evidential, as in 1.4, and the 'inferred', as in 1.3, lies in access to visual evidence of something happening and to the degree of 'reasoning' involved. The less obvious the evidence and the more the speaker has to rely on reasoning based on knowledge or on common sense, the more chance there is that the assumed evidential will be

used. An inferred evidential refers to something based on obvious evidence which can be easily observed (even if the event itself was not seen). This illustrates two types of inference — the one based on visible result, and the other based on reasoning, general knowledge and, ultimately, conjecture.

And finally, if one learnt the information from someone else, then 1.5 is the only correct option, with *-pidaka* marking reported evidentiality and recent past tense.

Tariana

1.5	Juse	i ida	di-manika- pidaka
	José	football	3sgnf-play-REC.P.REP
	'José has played football (we were told)'		

Despite the recent surge of interest in evidentiality, it remains one of the least known grammatical categories. Evidentiality systems differ in how complex they are: some distinguish just two terms, for instance, firsthand and non-firsthand. Others have six, or even more, terms. Some languages differentiate between one evidential (often with the meaning of 'reported' or 'non-firsthand') and no evidentiality at all. The term 'verificational' or 'validational' is sometimes used in place of 'evidential'. There is an excellent summary of work on recognizing this category, and naming it, in Jacobsen (1986). A brief discussion of terminological problems is under §1.3.

1.2 What is, and what is not, an evidential

1.2.1 The nature of linguistic evidentials

Evidentiality is a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information. In the chapters that follow, we will see that this covers the way in which the information was acquired, without necessarily relating to the degree of speaker's certainty concerning the statement or whether it is true or not. One evidential morpheme often covers several related sources. For instance, one evidential typically refers to things one hears, smells and feels by touch. To be considered as an evidential, a morpheme has to have 'source of information' as its core meaning; that is, the unmarked, or default interpretation. Evidence for such interpretation comes from various quarters, not least native speakers' intuitions, and the possibility of lexical 'reinforcement'. That is, an evidential can be, optionally, rephrased with a lexical item, or one can add a lexical explanation to an evidential. A visual evidential would then be rephrased as 'I saw it', and a reported evidential with 'they told me'. We return to these 'semantic clues' to what evidentials mean and how native speakers explain them, in Chapter 5 and then in §11.2.

'Evidential' and 'evidence' as a linguistic category differs from 'evidence' in common parlance. According to the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, 'evidence' covers 'the available facts, circumstances, etc., supporting or otherwise a belief, proposition, etc., or indicating whether or not a thing is true or valid'. In legal talk, evidence is 'information given personally or drawn from a document etc. and tending to prove a fact or proposition' and also 'statements or proofs admissible as testimony in a law court'. Whatever has to do with providing this kind of 'evidence' is 'evidential'.

Now, the linguistic notion of evidentiality — as discussed by Boas (1938) and exemplified in 1.1-5 above — differs drastically from the conventional usage by a non-linguist.

Linguistic evidentiality has nothing to do with providing proof in court or in argument, or indicating what is true and what is not, or indicating one's belief. All evidentiality does is supply the information source. The ways in which information is acquired — by seeing, hearing or in any other way — is its core meaning. In Hardman's (1986: 121) words, marking data source and concomitant categories is 'not a function of truth or falsity'. The truth value of an utterance is not affected by an evidential (cf. Donabédian 2001: 432). And, in fact, an evidential can have a truth value of its own. It can be negated and questioned, without negating or questioning the predicate itself (see §3.7). An evidential can even acquire its own time reference, distinct from that of the clause (see §3.8). Unlike most other grammatical categories, information source can be marked more than once in a clause, reflecting the same observer, or different observers, perceiving the information through different albeit compatible avenues (see §3.5).

This disparity between the common, or legal, notion of 'evidence' and 'evidential' is akin to that between linguistic borrowing and borrowing from a bank. Lay people — even first year students of linguistics — are often puzzled: why is it so that one always has to repay a monetary loan, while loan words are never given back? Or take the term 'gender'. In politically correct varieties of Modern English this label has almost displaced the term 'sex'. As a result, 'gender' now has two distinct senses. The Oxford Dictionary states: 'gender' is 'the state of being male or female'. It also states that 'gender' as a linguistic term refers to the 'grammatical classification of nouns and related words, which roughly corresponds to the two sexes and sexlessness'. In the same way the terms 'evidence' and 'evidential' each have two meanings: that of the courtroom and that of the linguist. This distinction, however, has not yet had time to percolate into dictionaries.

The unrecognised polysemy of the term 'evidence' and its derivative, 'evidential', has resulted in conceptual and terminological confusion. Most of all, this has influenced the ways in

which linguists with a firm grounding in European languages came to understand evidentiality. For many scholars of Romance and Germanic languages, having a way of saying 'apparently' or 'I do not believe' is a good enough pretext to put 'evidentiality' in the title of their paper (e.g. Hassler 2002). Yet marking information source as a grammatical category does not imply any reference to validity or reliability of knowledge or information (pace Hassler 2002: 157, or Hoff 1986). Neither does linguistic evidentiality bear any straightforward relationship to 'truth', or responsibility, let alone relevance. This is quite unlike the non-linguistic use of the term — there evidence means 'proof', and 'evidential' means 'to do with proof'.

Linguistic evidentials can in fact be manipulated in rather intricate ways in telling lies. Either the information source may be correct, and the information false; or the other way round. Speakers' proficiency in evidentials is often a token of their status within a community and indicates how well they know the existing conventions. However, expressing an appropriate information source, and choosing the correct marking for it, has nothing to do with one's 'epistemic stance', point of view or personal reliability.¹

Linguistic evidentiality is a grammatical system (and often one morphological paradigm). In languages with grammatical evidentiality, marking how one knows something is a must. Leaving this out results in a grammatically awkward 'incomplete' sentence (cf. Valenzuela 2003: 34 on Shipibo-Konibo, a Panoan language from Peru). Those who cannot get their evidential right are in trouble: they are considered linguistically incompetent and generally not worth talking to. Only in some systems can an evidential be omitted if recoverable from the context. This is very much unlike languages where saying explicitly how you know things is a matter of choice for the speaker.

Not infrequently, languages employ means other than grammatical evidentiality to describe different types of knowledge, and of information source. As shown by Frajzyngier (1985: 252), the inherent meaning of unmarked indicative sentences in a number of languages is to 'express what the speaker wants to convey as truth'. In languages with evidentials, some evidentials — usually the ones to do with visually acquired knowledge — may be formally unmarked. Once again, this is different from an 'unmarked indicative sentence' in languages where evidentiality is not obligatory, and statements are typically left vague as to the source of information.

Evidentials may acquire secondary meanings — of reliability, probability and possibility (known as epistemic extensions²), but they do not have to. A hypothetical modality may overlap with a non-firsthand evidential: both could be used for something one has not observed and thus has reservations about. This does not make a modal into an evidential. Cross-linguistically, evidentiality, modality (relating to the degree of certainty 'with which something is said': Matthews 1997: 228) and mood (relating to a speech act) are fully distinct categories. In each case, it is important to determine primary meaning for each of these on language-internal grounds. The ways in which semantic extensions of evidentials overlap with modalities and such meanings as probability or possibility depend on the individual system, and on the semantics of each individual evidential term. For instance, using the reported evidential in Estonian may imply that the speaker simply acquired the information from someone else. Or the speaker could choose to use the reported evidential if he or she does not vouch for the veracity of the reported information. Reported evidential in larger systems — such as Quechua or Shipibo-Konibo — does not have such connotations. In many languages (e.g. Quechua or Tariana), markers of

hypothetical modality and irrealis can occur in conjunction with evidentials on one verb or clause (see §8.3). This further corroborates their status as distinct categories.

Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of some other modality (see highly convincing arguments in De Haan 1999, Lazard 1999; 2001 and DeLancey 2001, and in studies of individual languages, e.g. Skribnik 1998: 205-6), or of tense-aspect.³ Scholars tend to assume that evidentials are modals largely because of their absence in most major European languages, thus trying to explain an unusual category in terms of some other, more conventional, notion. There is simply no other place in a Standard Average European grammar where they could be assigned. For want of a better option, evidentials are then translated into European languages with epistemic markers. For instance, 1.4, 'José played football (assumed)', can be translated into English using 'apparently' or 'probably' as a short cut. Those researchers who base their analysis of language data on the ways in which these data are glossed or translated into English are thus misled.⁴

That evidentials may have semantic extensions related to probability and speaker's evaluation of the trustworthiness of information does not make evidentiality a kind of modality. This can be compared to the semantics of gender systems: in many languages feminine gender is associated with diminution, or endearment (see numerous examples in Aikhenvald 2000), and masculine gender with augmentative; this however does not mean that gender is a type of diminutive or augmentative category. The kinds of extensions one can get for a particular evidential meaning in a language largely depend on the structure of the evidentiality system and its place among other verbal categories.⁵

Evidentiality and mirativity — a category whose primary meaning is related to unprepared mind, new information and speaker's surprise — are conceptually related, albeit

distinct. Any evidential other than visual or firsthand may, but does not have to, extend to refer to 'unusual' and 'surprising' information (called 'mirative' by DeLancey 1997; see Lazard 1999 and DeLancey 2001 on difficulties associated with teasing apart the categories of evidentiality and mirativity).

Evidentiality can be expressed in a variety of ways. Some languages have dedicated affixes or clitics, while others have their evidentiality marking fused with another category (as with tense in Tariana). Evidentiality is not restricted to any type of language. Languages with evidentiality can be fusional, agglutinating or isolating; alternatively, they can be synthetic or polysynthetic.⁶ Just occasionally do Creoles and Pidgins have evidentials — see Nichols (1986: 245) on Chinese Pidgin Russian, where evidentiality is the only obligatory category. Neither does the presence or absence of evidentiality depend on whether a language is head- or dependent-marking. No evidentials have been described for Sign Languages.

Evidentiality specifications may be made independently of clause type, modality or tense-aspect choice. Alternatively, a choice in the evidentiality system may depend on tense, aspect or clause type. As we will see below, a significant number of languages distinguish evidentiality only in the past, and just a few do so in the future. Dependencies between evidentiality and other categories are discussed in Chapter 8 below (in the spirit of Aikhenvald and Dixon 1998a).

The choice of evidentiality often correlates with person. Some evidentials may not occur in a first person context.⁷ This is understandable: the idea of using reported or inferred evidential when talking about oneself sounds counterintuitive. If these seemingly unusual choices are available in first person, they may produce additional semantic effects. An inferential or a reported evidential may describe something the speaker cannot remember, or does not want to take responsibility for, or did inadvertently. Evidentials may be mutually exclusive with certain

moods and with modality markers. Typically, fewer evidentiality choices are available in questions and in commands than in statements. Quite a few languages simply do not employ evidentials in commands.

Evidentiality may form one obligatory inflectional system, with information source as its core semantics. Such systems are our main focus of study. Evidential meanings may be expressed in a variety of other ways, by using different grammatical mechanisms but not forming one coherent category. In some such cases, one can distinguish several evidentiality subsystems. In others, evidentiality specifications are 'scattered' all over the grammar. In other words, evidential meanings are there, but they do not form a single grammatical category. Languages with 'scattered' evidentiality may employ semantic parameters which diverge somewhat from those recurrent in languages with evidentiality as a single tightly-knit and coherent category. The composition and status of evidentiality in each individual case is important to bear in mind if one wishes to achieve cross-linguistically valid generalisations (see §3.3).

Languages with evidentiality tend to develop conventions concerning preferred choices in different discourse genres. An evidential in itself may be considered a token of a genre. Speakers of languages with evidentials may say that a story is not a story without a reported evidential. An unexpected evidentiality choice may acquire additional stylistic overtones — of sarcasm, irony or indignation. Evidentiality choices correlate with backgrounding, or foregrounding, a part of the narrative. All this contributes to the importance of evidentials for human communication and the ways in which speakers view the world.

Obligatory evidentials presuppose the requirement of explicitly stating the exact source of information, and may go together with certain cultural attitudes and practices. The spread of shared cultural practices from one people to another may affect the use of evidentials. The

introduction of new cultural practices such as radio, television or reading may provide additional semantic extensions for evidentials (see Chapter 11).

A strong argument in favour of the importance of evidentials for human cognition lies in their metalinguistic valuation and speakers' awareness of their necessity. An evidentially unmarked statement (if at all possible in a language) may be treated with suspicion and ultimately contempt. Those who cannot get their evidentials right may be branded as crazy, unreliable and generally not worth talking to. Languages without evidentiality are often viewed as somehow deficient by those whose languages have evidentiality. Evidentials often make their way into contact languages (such as Spanish, Portuguese and even English spoken by second language learners of American Indian extraction). And they readily spread through language contact.

1.2.2 Expressing information source by means other than grammatical evidentials

Every language has some way of referring to the source of information; but not every language has grammatical evidentiality. Having lexical means for optional specification of the source of knowledge is probably universal — cf. English *I guess, they say, I hear that* etc. as well as lexical verbs such as *allege* (e.g. *the alleged killer of X*). A valuable discussion of 'parenthetic' expressions in English, which are widely used to optionally indicate the source of information, can be found in Urmston (1952) and Dixon (1991: 209-15). These lexical means can be of different statuses. They may include adverbial expressions such as *reportedly*, or introductory clauses with complementation markers, such as *it seems to me that*, or particles, such as Russian *jakoby, mol* and *deskatj* all indicating 'hearsay' (Rakhilina 1996). Adverbial phrases dealing with speaker's attitude in Japanese (Aoki 1986: 234-5) can also be considered a lexical way of referring to how information has been obtained and to its validation. Modal verbs are often used

to express meanings connected with information source (cf., e.g., Tasmowski and Dendale 1994, on 'evidential-like' interpretation of *pouvoir* 'be able to' in French, or King and Nadasdi 1999, on how French-English bilinguals employ verbs of opinion or belief which they — misleadingly — call 'evidentiality'). The semantic scope of such expressions ranges from information source to the degree of speakers commitment to the veracity of the statement, e.g. English *reportedly* or its Estonian equivalent *kuuldavasti* (with the same meaning). However, Estonian also has a dedicated paradigm for reported evidential, while English has nothing of this sort. An exemplary discussion of how Hebrew and Arabic lack grammatical evidentiality is in Isaksson (2000).

Saying that English parentheticals are 'evidentials' is akin to saying that time words like 'yesterday' or 'today' are tense markers. These expressions are not obligatory and do not constitute a grammatical category; consequently, they are only tangential to the present discussion. Saying that English has 'evidentiality' (cf. Fox 2001) is misleading: this implies a confusion between what is grammaticalised and what is lexical in a language. Lexical expressions may, of course, provide historical sources for evidential systems (see Chapter 9). Lexical ways of indicating source of information may reinforce grammatical evidentials. Or one can add a lexical explanation to an evidentially marked clause, to disambiguate an evidential which has several meanings.

Throughout this book I will be concerned with just the grammatical coding of evidentiality. Grammar is taken to deal with closed systems, which can be realised through bound morphemes, clitics and words which belong to full grammatical word classes, such as prepositions, preverbs or particles. As I mentioned above, in almost all languages, source of information can be expressed lexically, for example, by adverbs such as 'reportedly' or

'apparently'. In itself, a semantic study of such expressions is a separate task. I won't attempt it here.

It is, however, worth mentioning that grammar and lexicon can and do interact. And evidentiality may well interact with the lexicon of a language in a variety of ways. Lexical classes of verbs can require certain evidentiality choices: for instance, internal states and processes, 'felt' rather than seen, are often cast in non-visual or non-firsthand evidential. Such preferences may get lexicalised as restricted evidentiality choices for predicate types and construction types. We return to this in Chapter 10.

Meanings to do with how people know things may be expressed in yet another indirect way, without developing a dedicated form with primarily evidential meaning. Non-evidential categories frequently acquire evidential extensions. A verbal form — e.g. conditional mood, or a perfect, or a passive — can develop an evidential-like meaning as a 'side effect' without having 'source of information' as its primary meaning (see the discussion in Lazard 1999). One of the best-known examples is the conditional in French (known as 'conditionnel d'information incertaine') used to relate information obtained from another source for which the speaker does not take any responsibility. In a few Iranian and Turkic languages, and also in Georgian, perfect has similar connotations, while in Kinyarwanda (Bantu: Givón and Kimenyi 1974) the choice of a complementation strategy correlates with the expressions of ways in which information was obtained. The term 'evidentiality system' in the sense proposed here is not appropriate for these systems. The extensions of grammatical categories and forms to cover evidential-like meanings will be referred to as an 'evidentiality strategy' (see Chapter 4). Historically, evidentiality strategies often develop into evidentials (see Chapter 9).

1.3 'Evidentials' as a linguistic term

Up until the late 19th century only those linguistic categories which were found in classical Indo-European languages were accorded due status and investigated in some depth. Since these languages have no grammaticalised information source, the concept of evidentiality had not made its way into linguistics until 'exotic' languages started being described in terms of categories relevant for them, rather than from a limited Indo-European perspective.

Pre-twentieth century grammatical descriptions of Quechua and Aymara, languages with obligatory evidentials, are particularly instructive. In one of the earliest grammars of Quechua, *Grammatica o arte de la lengua general de los indios de los reynos del Peru* in 1560, Santo Tomás treats evidential particles, together with other morphemes which 'do not fit into the model of Romance languages' (Dedenbach-Salazar 1997a: 297) as simply ornate particles with no meaning of their own ('de suyo nada significan: pero adornan, o ayudan a la significacion de los nombres, o verbos a que se añaden', '(they) do not mean anything of their own: but they adorn, or help the meaning of the nouns, or verbs to which they attach': pp. 142-8). Along similar lines, the anonymous grammar of Quechua published in 1586 (Anónimo 1586: Dedenbach-Salazar 1997a: 301) treats evidential markers as 'partículas diversas (...) que [...] sirven de ornativas' ('various particles (...) which [...] serve to adorn') (see further examples and discussion in Dedenbach-Salazar 1997a).⁸ Bertonio (1603), in his grammar of Aymara (see Calvo Pérez 1997; Hardman 1986: 113), considered the Aymara information source markers as 'ornate particles', since 'without them the sentence is perfectly fine'. Torres Rubio (1616: 244) also treated evidentials as particles 'which serve no other function than to adorn a sentence'. In Quechua and Aymara studies, the same attitude persisted until much later. Ráez (1917), in his description of Wanka Quechua, described the direct evidential suffix 'as a substitute for copula in the present indicative

tense' (Floyd 1999: 3). Ellen Ross (1963) called Aymara evidential markers 'emphatic suffixes', while Juan Enrique Ebbing (1965) called them 'suffixes of adornment and emphasis' (Hardman 1986: 113). Indo-European-oriented grammarians consistently overlooked the meaning of evidentials as markers of information source.⁹

Perhaps the first scholar who explicitly formulated the notion of obligatory information source was Boas. In his introduction to *The Handbook of American Indian Languages*, Boas (1911a: 43) states that 'each language has a peculiar tendency to select this or that aspect of the mental image which is conveyed by the expression of the thought'. Using the example *The man is sick*, he comments that 'this example might be further expanded by adding modalities of the verb', explaining how in Kwakiutl 'in case the speaker had not seen the sick person himself, he would have to express whether he knows by hearsay or by evidence that the person is sick, or whether he has dreamed it'. He goes on saying, in his sketch of Kwakiutl (1911b: 443), that 'to suffixes expressing subjective relations belong those expressing the source of subjective knowledge — as by hearsay, or by a dream'. The four evidential suffixes in Kwakiutl are then listed under the heading 'suffixes denoting the source of information' (§32, p. 496). In his 1938 article 'Language', he mentioned information source as an obligatory category in some languages (see §1.1 above). And in his essay 'Language and culture' (Boas 1942: 182), Boas goes on to comment on the potential usefulness of Kwakiutl-type evidentials for newspaper reporters.

Since Boas work, evidentials made their way into many grammars of North American Indian languages. The exact place of evidentials as a category in its own right took time to be fully defined. Quite a few scholars considered evidentials a kind of mood, mainly because of the verbal slot they go in. In his grammar of Tsimshian, Boas (1911c: 348-9) grouped evidentials together with 'modal suffixes' on these structural grounds. Sapir (1922) treated the 'inferential'

evidential in Takelma as one of six tense-mode categories. And Swadesh (1939) analysed the quotative and the inferential evidential in Nootka as 'modes of evidence', within a larger chart of inflection of 'modes'.

The importance of marking information source as a separate category gradually became an integral part of various grammars of North American Indian languages. In a series of articles on Wintu, Dorothy Lee (1938, 1944, 1950 and 1959) recognized evidentials as a special category and discussed them under the label of 'suffixes giving the source of information' (1938: 102). See Jacobsen (1986: 4-5), on further mentions of grammaticalized information source.

Up until Jakobson (1957), the term 'evidential' was accorded a somewhat different meaning from the one employed since. Boas used it in the meaning of 'something for which there is evidence', that is, similar to 'inferred on the basis of visible traces'. This usage is obviously closer to the lay person's 'evidential' as something to do with evidence than 'evidential' as a generic term for information source; the usage we owe to Jakobson (1957). The gloss 'evidently: as is shown by evidence' appears as the translation for the suffix *-xEnt* in Kwakiutl (Boas 1911b: 496), and Boas (1947: 237; 245) listed this same suffix among 'a small group of suffixes expressing source and certainty of knowledge'. That is, the linguistic 'evidential' started its life as a term for a subtype of grammaticalized information source rather than a generic label (cf. Jacobsen 1986: 4).

The term 'evidential' as a label for a grammatical category broader than simple inference was first introduced by Jakobson in 1957 (reprinted in 1995: 135). The definition he gave is as follows: 'EⁿE^{ns}/E^s evidential is a tentative label for the verbal category which takes into account three events — a narrated event (Eⁿ), a speech event (E^s), and a narrated speech event (E^{ns}). The speaker reports an event on the basis of someone else's report (quotative, i.e. hearsay evidence),

of a dream (revelative evidence), of a guess (presumptive evidence) or of his own previous experience (memory evidence).' He then illustrates evidentiality, using Bulgarian: 'Bulgarian conjugation distinguishes two semantically opposite sets of forms: "direct narration" ($E^{ns}=E^s$) vs. "indirect narration" ($E^{ns}\neq E^s$). To our question, what happened to the steamer *Evdokija*?, a Bulgarian first answered: *zaminala* "it is claimed to have sailed", and then added: *zamina* "I bear witness; it sailed".'

Importantly, Jakobson was the first to draw a sharp distinction between mood and evidentiality as independent categories.¹⁰

The term 'evidential' to refer to grammaticalized information source appears to have become established by the mid-60s (Jacobsen 1986: 6). Sherzer (1976) includes 'evidential or source of information markers' among areal features relevant for North American Indian languages.

Interest in evidentiality has grown during the past thirty years. The ground-breaking article by Barnes (1984), on Tuyuca, followed by Malone (1988), alerted linguists to the existence of complex multi-term evidentials in South America. Evidentiality became a recognised and widely acknowledged category in Quechua and Aymara studies (e.g. Levinsohn 1975, Jake and Chuquin 1979, Weber 1986 and especially Hardman ed. 1981 and Hardman 1986).

Evidentials came to be recognised throughout the world — in Philippine languages (Ballard 1974), in Warlpiri (Laughren 1982), in Tibetan (DeLancey 1986), Japanese (Aoki 1986), and many more. Further work on various languages, language families and language areas, will be referred to throughout the rest of the book as required. A breakthrough in the studies of evidentiality was marked by a seminal collection of papers in Chafe and Nichols (1986) which drew together systems from all over the world. A first preliminary survey of evidentials was done

by Willett (1988). As we will see throughout this book, this survey, however valuable, contains a number of inaccuracies and simplifications (see note 18 to Chapter 2).

A somewhat different view and different terminology for small evidential systems has been developed independently by European scholars. In contrast to North American Indian languages, languages of Eurasia hardly ever have more than one or two evidential terms. The most frequent type of system is the one where, in Lazard's words (2001), 'evidentially marked discourse is opposed to neutral discourse'. One of the earliest attempts to label this evidentially marked form whose meaning is typically non-firsthand or indirect experience, and sometimes also secondhand information, comes from Décsy (1965: 184). In his analysis of languages from the Permian subgroup of Finno-Ugric, he used the term 'form of indirect experience' (*indirekte Erlebnisform*). The first analysis of this category, its expression and meaning is by Haarmann (1970). While recognising the fact that 'indirect experience' can be expressed either lexically or grammatically in any language, Haarmann analyses it as an independent grammatical category well represented throughout Eurasia.¹¹

Focus on languages which have one, typically non-firsthand, evidential contrasted with evidentially neutral forms gave rise to terminological conventions different from what became standard in North American Indian linguistics. The term used for such small systems in Guentchéva (1996) is *médiatif*, or 'mediative' (also see Lazard 1996, 1999, 2001). (This term is occasionally extended to larger systems. An alternative, proposed by Hagège 1995, is *médiaphorique*.) The corresponding term in the Turkic tradition, suggested by Johanson (1996, 1998, 2000), is 'indirective'. This is, perhaps, a continuation of the tradition — originated by Haarmann (1970) — whereby 'indirect experience' is treated as a separate category, and not a subtype of a more general notion of information source, or evidentiality.

Another terminological tradition has been established for the languages of the Balkans. The confusion in the ways the term 'witnessed' was used to cover the evidentials in these languages has led Aronson (1967) to propose a new term. He introduced the label 'confirmative', to 'describe Bulgarian evidentials in which the speaker is markedly vouching for the truth of the statement' (Friedman 2003: 190). In his own work Friedman (1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1994, 2000 and 2003) introduced the term 'nonconfirmative' as its opposite, 'to refer to evidentials that attenuate personal vouching by means of reportedness, inference, sarcasm, or surprise'. The opposition of confirmative and nonconfirmative is that of firsthand versus non-firsthand (type A1 in §2.1 below). In the literature on Quechua, evidentials are often called 'validationals' or 'verificationals'. Grammarians of Aymara (e.g. Hardman 1986) call them 'data source markers'.

Guentchéva (1996) is a major collection of papers predominantly investigating small evidential systems, and covers only a few of the larger systems. Johanson and Utas (2000) present an informed study of two-term evidentiality systems in Turkic, Iranian and a few neighbouring languages. A typological overview accompanied by studies of several individual systems is in Aikhenvald (2003a). This typology is the precursor of the present book.

At present, evidentials seem to be 'the flavour of the month'.¹² Linguists of all trends and persuasions talk about evidentials and evidence, for all sorts of languages. Not surprisingly, the same term is applied and overapplied to different things. And yet there is no exhaustive cross-linguistic study of how languages deal with the marking of information source in their grammars. This book aims to fill this gap, based on the languages hitherto described. A further aim is to establish a common conceptual ground for the analysis of evidentials as a grammatical category,

its semantics and expression, as well as development, loss, and correlations with other grammatical categories.

A cross-linguistically based typological analysis of grammatical evidentiality will provide us with insights as to how to investigate this phenomenon in new, previously undescribed languages. Limiting the notion of evidentiality to grammar will help avoiding its 'extensions which start to stretch the sense beyond coherent definition' (using Matthews's 1997: 90 expression).

Examples will be drawn from over 500 languages from all parts of the world. Grammatical evidentiality is not a terribly frequent phenomenon; it is only found in about 25% of the world's languages. Most familiar languages — such as English, or French — lack it. This is why most of my examples come from relatively unknown languages, frequently overlooked by typologists and by linguists in general. My additional aim is to introduce these languages into linguistic circulation.

In this book I have only been able to mention a fraction of the available references on evidentials. Many works which discuss evidentiality or 'evidence' are not mentioned here, either because they are tangential to the general theme of this book, or because the claims and the analyses are not fully substantiated or convincing,¹³ or because a particular source merely provides additional examples of a point already amply exemplified. I hope to provide a useful overview of types of grammatical evidentials, and their functions and semantics across the world. But note that this volume is not intended to be an encyclopedia of evidentials.

1.4 Challenges

Evidential systems of varied size are scattered all over the world. They are particularly frequent in South American and North American Indian languages, in the languages of the Caucasus, and in the languages of the Tibeto-Burman family (see §9.2.1, and Map there). However, until recently, there was no comprehensive typological framework which would account for the analysis of varied evidential systems, their semantics, function, the ways in which they interact with other grammatical categories (such as person, negation, clause types) and so on. This has made writing grammars of previously undescribed or poorly documented languages with evidentiality a particularly daunting task.

The relative lack of comprehensive typologically informed grammars is a major challenge for a comprehensive typological analysis of any category. Evidentiality is no exception. European-oriented researchers often face difficulties in determining the exact meanings of this 'exotic' category. Hardman (1986: 113-14) provides a fascinating account of the 'blindness' of numerous researchers to evidentiality, or 'data-source marking', in Aymara, within the period from 1603 up until the late 1960s — evidentials were simply disregarded as 'ornate' optional particles (see further examples in §1.3). And yet, for Aymara speakers, using the right evidential is crucial: those who do not mark their information source are branded as arrogant 'liars' (see §11.1-2).

Sticking to a highly restrictive formalist framework often proves to be particularly detrimental in analysing unusual categories. Migliazza (1972), in his cross-dialectal grammar of Yanomami — done within the framework of the transformational grammar of the time — missed evidentiality altogether. In fact, some Yanomami dialects have as many as four evidentials, for example, Xamatauteri (Ramirez 1994: 169-70; 316-17) with firsthand, non-firsthand, inferred

and reported. Sanuma, the Yanomami dialect described by Borgman (1990: 165-73), has three terms: firsthand, 'verification' (by seeing evidence or by hearing from someone who has firsthand knowledge of the state or event) and inferential. And Yanam (described by Gomez 1990: 97) shows just two evidentials, firsthand and non-firsthand.

The problem of detecting evidentials in a language may be aggravated by an inadequate fieldwork methodology. Basing one's grammar exclusively on asking questions and grammatical elicitation — translating from a lingua franca into the native language — and on sentences taken out of their context, leads to getting only a small part of the grammatical structure right. Speakers of Kamaiurá, a Tupí-Guaraní language with a very complex system of evidentials, often omit the markers of source of information in elicited sentences. Such sentences come out as unnatural, 'something artificial, sterile, deprived of colour' (Seki 2000: 347). Typologists must rely on careful grammatical descriptions — based on analysis of spontaneous texts in the language under study — unconstrained by any formalism which has a restricted vogue, in order to bring together language facts and their typological assessments.

One of the major challenges for a comprehensive study of evidentiality is the lack of good quality descriptions and in-depth analyses. Evidentiality — unlike case, gender, aspect, mood or tense — is not found in familiar Indo-European languages and cannot be easily accounted for by the grammatical categories which well-known languages are expected to have. Those who follow formulaic guidelines for grammar writing may thus find it hard to accommodate evidentials. Hence the variability of the places in grammars where evidentiality is discussed. Evidentiality is sometimes looked upon as 'modality', or 'cognitive modality'. Or it is considered as a sort of 'mood'. Linguists are often at a loss to decide where exactly evidentiality belongs.

It is the purpose of this book to put evidentiality on the map as a category in its own right. Besides providing a cross-linguistically valid conceptual framework for investigating evidentiality world-wide, I aim to supply field-workers and grammar writers with appropriate analytic tools for disentangling varied facets of grammaticalized marking of information source in the world's languages. At the end of this book the reader will find a brief questionnaire for investigating evidentiality and evidentiality strategies. Its objective is to provide a checklist of main points without which evidentiality can scarcely be understood.

1.5 How this book is organized

My aim here is to present a functional-typological, empirically based account of grammatical evidentiality across the world's languages.¹⁴ The categories and their properties are explained inductively — based on facts, not assumptions. As Bloomfield (1933: 20), put it: 'The only useful generalisations about language are inductive generalisations. Features which we think ought to be universal may be absent from the very next language that becomes accessible The fact that some features are, at any rate, widespread, is worthy of notice and calls for an explanation; when we have adequate data about many languages, we shall have to return to the problem of general grammar and to explain these similarities and divergences, but this study, when it comes, will not be speculative but inductive.'

In Chapter 2, I start with a survey of evidentiality systems attested in the world's languages. Evidential systems vary in their size and in the kinds of information sources expressed. Some languages mark just reported information; others distinguish firsthand and non-firsthand. Visually obtained data may be contrasted with data obtained through hearing or smelling, or through inference of various kinds. Many of these larger systems also have a

separate marker for reported or secondhand information. Few have a special marker for 'thirdhand'. At the end of the chapter, I summarise the semantic parameters and the evidential systems so far attested.

No particular language type is associated with marking evidentiality. Just about any kind of morpheme can have an evidential meaning. Evidentials which refer to visually obtained or 'firsthand' information tend to be less formally marked than other evidentials. Circumstances under which evidentials may be omitted also vary from system to system. A language may have several subsystems of evidentiality. Some languages can indicate two information sources at once. An evidential can be negated or questioned. Evidentials can have their own 'truth value': using a wrong evidential is one way of telling a lie. These issues are discussed in Chapter 3.

Non-indicative moods and modalities, past tenses and perfects, passives, nominalizations and complementation strategies can acquire a secondary usage to do with reference to an information source. So can person marking. Perceptual meanings — visual or non-visual — can be encoded in demonstratives. Evidential extensions of these categories — which I call 'evidentiality strategies' — are discussed in Chapter 4. Every language has some way of reporting what someone else said to the speaker and of quoting another person's speech. Reported speech can be viewed as a universal evidential strategy. How reported speech is marked and how it compares to reported evidentials cross-linguistically are also discussed in this chapter.

Meanings expressed in evidentiality systems vary across the world's languages, and so do the extensions of varied evidentials. For instance, the core meaning of a reported evidential is always verbal report. Such an evidential may also acquire an overtone of 'doubt' ('This is what I have been told, but I don't vouch for it'). The core meaning of a visual evidential is something the speaker has seen (rather than heard, or inferred, or has been told). This evidential can be extended

to relate generally known facts, and sometimes even to facts the speaker is sure of. The semantic complexity of evidentials of different sorts and systems are the topic of Chapter 5.

'Mirativity' is a category manifesting 'unexpected information' with overtones of surprise and admiration. Its independence as a category in its own right rather than a semantic extension of evidentiality is now beyond doubt (since the seminal article by DeLancey 1997). A 'mirative' extension is typical for many evidentials which do not involve any visual or firsthand information. These are analysed in Chapter 6, in the context of the semantics and structure of a given evidential system. The appendix at the end of the chapter contains a few illustrative examples demonstrating the existence of a separate grammatical category of 'mirativity' in a number of languages.

When the source of information is stated, who is the observer? In other words, whose information source does the evidential reflect? The question of the identity of the observer is tightly linked to the interaction between evidentiality and the value of person. Chapter 7 shows how this works.

Different evidentiality choices may be available in a statement, a question, or a command; evidentiality choices may depend on choices made in a mood or modality, or under negation. The existing tendencies are considered in Chapter 8.

Every evidential has its own history, and a pathway of development. An evidential may go back to a verb of speech, or a verb of perception. Or it can develop out of another open or closed class via grammaticalization and reanalysis. A small evidentiality system may develop out of one of the evidentiality strategies analysed in Chapter 4. Evidentiality is prone to borrowing and linguistic diffusion: evidentiality systems often arise, or can be lost, under the impact of language contact and are found in a variety of linguistic areas. Language obsolescence may result

in their loss or drastic restructuring. As a result of language contact, languages — among them familiar European varieties, such as Andean or Bolivian Spanish — may develop evidentials. These issues are discussed in Chapter 9, alongside an overview of the distribution of evidentials across the world.

How to choose the correct evidential when confronted with more than one avenue for information acquisition? Rules for making a choice in these cases relate to 'preferred evidentials'. Evidentials often become conventionalised in different genres and styles of discourse. An unexpected evidential choice produces additional rhetorical effects. The choice of evidentials may partly depend on the lexical class of a verb, and there may be correlations between evidentials and the organization of the lexicon. This is the topic of Chapter 10.

And finally, what are evidentials good for? What makes them so important for human cognition and communication? Speaking a language with evidentials presupposes the requirement of explicitly stating the exact source of information — this may go together with certain cultural attitudes and practices, both traditional and modern. Speakers of languages with evidentials are usually aware of having to always say 'how you know it'. These issues are addressed in Chapter 11. What little we know about evidentials in child language acquisition is summarised in the appendix to this chapter.

Chapter 12 is a précis of the book. It contains a summary and a brief recapitulation of the overall conclusions. Here I also suggest further problems and further routes of investigation of evidentiality across the languages of the world.

A major objective of this book is to encourage scholars to undertake fieldwork-based in-depth investigations of evidentials all over the world. How should one go about it? A short fieldworker's guide provides suggestions to fieldworkers on how to gather materials on

evidentiality systems, in terms of semantic, formal and other parameters which have proved to be cross-linguistically relevant.

The book is accompanied by a glossary of linguistic terms used throughout, within the context of problems linked to evidentiality. This is provided in order to avoid terminological confusion, and to make sure the readers understand what the author means.

¹ An example of how the laymen's use of the term 'evidence' has affected some linguistic usage is a definition of evidentiality as "'natural epistemology", the ways in which the ordinary people unhampered by philosophical traditions naturally regard the source and reliability of their knowledge' (Chafe and Nichols 1986: vii). This reflects a limited perspective: it presupposes that marking information source is the same as marking 'reliability'. Evidentials are indeed part of what is covered by the philosophical term 'epistemology' inasmuch as it relates to information source. Epistemology is defined as 'the philosophical theory of knowledge, which seeks to define and distinguish its principal varieties, identify its sources, and establish its limits' (Bullock and Stallybrass 1988: 279). Note that this definition of epistemology does not include attitude to truth or reliability of information or of knowledge. Chung and Timberlake (1985: 244-6) correctly categorise evidentiality as an 'epistemological mode' to do with information source, using the term 'epistemology' in its conventional, philosophical meaning.

Unfortunately, the connection between evidentiality and 'reliability' of information has become quite entrenched: even Matthews (1997: 120) in what is by far the best dictionary of linguistics to date, defines evidential as 'particle, inflection which is one of a set that make clear the source or reliability of the evidence on which a statement is based'. In Chafe's (1986) terminology, evidentiality in a 'narrow sense' refers to marking the **source** of knowledge. Evidentiality in a 'broad sense' is marking speaker's **attitude** towards his/her knowledge of reality. Such a view of evidentiality subsumes specification of probability, degree of precision or truth, and various other extensions typically expressed with modalities. This approach dilutes the sharp boundaries between evidentiality and various modalities, including hypotheticals, irrealis

and probabilitative moods. Ultimately this produces a conceptual and a terminological confusion, and fails to account for the numerous languages where evidentiality is fully independent from each of such categories (see, for instance, §8.3). The occasionally existing link between some evidential choices and the expression of certainty or uncertainty (see, for instance, §5.3.1 and §5.4.4) is then mistaken for a universal.

Along similar lines, Dendale and Tasmowski (2001: 343) claim that 'in the evidential systems of many languages, the forms marking the source of information also mark the speaker's attitude towards the reliability of that information'. (A similar stance underlies the discussion by Nuyts 2001.) Throughout this book, I will show that this is far from universal, and definitely not an 'empirical fact' (pace Dendale and Tasmowski 2001: 242-3). Whether or not an evidential has an 'epistemic' extension (that is, an extension to do with probability or possibility) depends (a) on the structure of the evidential system; (b) on the terms within this system: for instance, epistemic extensions could be associated with reported evidentials in some and with inferred evidentials in other languages; and (c) on the overall structure of the language: if a language has a vast array of modalities with epistemic meanings, one can hardly expect highly specialized evidentials to have any such extensions. The view of evidentiality as type of 'epistemology' or 'epistemic modality' is ultimately based on an attempt to reconcile the 'exotic' facts of languages with large evidentiality systems and modality-oriented familiar languages of Europe.

Along similar lines, I disregard attempts to apply poorly elaborated notions of 'weak' and 'strong' evidentiality which firstly do not draw a necessary line between modalities and source of information, and secondly are based on a highly restricted set of data, such as Mushin (2001a). In the same way, establishing correlations between inference and information source can only be

achieved after a complete investigation of evidentiality as a grammatical category; this makes studies of lexical strategies referring to information source, such as Ifantidou (2001), premature and tangential for the analysis of grammatical expression of information source, despite the fact evidential markers occasionally come from lexical sources (see §9.1.6).

² The term 'epistemic' has different meanings in different disciplines. It is defined, in the Oxford English Dictionary (1999), as 'of or relating to knowledge or degree of acceptance'. The philosophical term 'epistemics', signifies 'the scientific study of knowledge' (Bullock and Stallybrass 1988: 279). In common linguistic usage (e.g. Matthews 1997: 115) the word 'epistemic' is used very differently: it means 'indicating factual necessity, probability, possibility etc.', rather than 'relating to knowledge'.

³ Pace Bybee (1985), Palmer (1987), van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) and Willett (1988). The proponents of such views hardly ever provide any justification for their treatment of evidentials, simply assuming that evidentials are modals (also see Dahl 1985: 148, 190). Palmer (1986: 51) considered evidentiality as 'indication by the speaker of his (lack of) commitment to the truth of the proposition being expressed', adding that 'it would be a futile exercise to decide whether a particular system (or even a term in a system in some cases) is evidential rather than a judgement' (70). Similarly, for Frajzyngier (1985: 250), it 'appears rather obvious that the different manners of acquiring knowledge correspond to different degrees of certainty about the truth of the proposition'. According to Trask (1999: 189), 'modality shades off imperceptibly into several other categories', one of which is said to be evidentiality. Throughout the book it will be demonstrated the ways in which such suggestions are inadequate.

⁴ A prime example of this is Wierzbicka's (1994, 1996: 427-58) 'reinterpretation' of examples in Chafe and Nichols (1986) on the basis of how they are translated into English.

⁵ Attempts have been made to place all putatively evidential markers on a scale, from those that have 'context-free' semantic interpretations of source of information (that is, evidentials proper as discussed throughout this book) to those which may or may not have a conceptualised interpretation of source of information (such as one possible interpretation of English *must*: Mushin 2001a: 30-3). This approach suffers from lack of distinction between grammatical evidentiality and lexical and other means which may acquire evidential-like meaning extensions. Semantic extensions of evidentials can scarcely be arranged on any such a scale — see Chapter 5, for the discussion of evidentials and their meanings.

⁶ Dahl (1985), on the basis of a small sample of languages, arrived at a conclusion that evidentials are only found in agglutinating languages. An investigation of a larger selection of languages does not confirm this.

⁷ In some previous studies, attempts were made to reduce evidentiality to a kind of 'knowledge' of the 1st person speaker (Anderson 1986: 276). Evidentiality covers more than just person and relates only marginally to the 'speaker-hearer contract' (pace Givón 1982: 43).

⁸ Along similar lines, in his extensive grammar of Cuzco Quechua, Middendorf (1890: 80-1) considered the direct evidential as just an affirmative particle. Similar examples are too numerous to list.

⁹ Not all language families have been so unlucky. According to Friedman (2003: 189) and Dankoff (1982: 412), the earliest description of an evidential 'unwitnessed/witnessed opposition' goes back to al-Kasgarī's 11th century compendium of Turkic grammar *Divān al-luġāt al-Turk*.

¹⁰ Unlike evidentials, which refer to information source, 'mood characterises the relation between the narrated event and its participants with reference to the participants of the speech event: in Vinogradov's formulation, this category "reflects the speaker's view of the character of the connection between the action and the actor or the goal"' (Jakobson 1995: 135; also see Vinogradov 1947: 581). Vinogradov further expands this definition by saying that the category of mood 'expresses the evaluation of reality of the link between the action and its subject from the speaker's viewpoint, or the desire of the speaker to either accomplish or deny this connection. That is, the category of mood is a grammatical category in the verbal system, which defines the modality of the action, i.e. implies the relationship of the action to actuality as established by the speaker' (translation mine). This definition of modality/mood is basically similar to the one provided in the Glossary of terms, and that provided by Matthews (1997).

¹¹ This is in contrast to Weinreich's (1963: 120-1) approach to evidential categories (such as Hopi quotative and Bulgarian and Turkish non-firsthand) as kinds of mood, or 'pragmatic operators', akin to German subjunctive.

¹² During past two decades, a surge of interest in 'evidentiality' has resulted in a large number of publications and definitions. Quite a few of these are misleading. For instance, Anderson (1986: 274-5) lists the following properties which he considers as 'definitional' for evidentials: '(a) evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim, whether direct evidence plus observation (no inference needed), evidence plus inference, inference (evidence unspecified), reasoned expectation from logic and other facts; (b) evidentials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim about something else; (c) evidentials have the indication of evidence as

in (a) as their primary meaning, not only as a pragmatic inference; (d) morphologically, evidentials are inflections, clitics or other free syntactic elements (not compounds or derivational forms)'. While points (a)-(c) are basically sound, point (d) — which concerns the surface realization of the category — should not be among its definitional properties. For one thing, this criterion would not work for systems in which the distinction between inflectional and derivational categories is not clear-cut. Further criteria include (p. 277): '(i) evidentials are normally used in assertions (realis clauses), not in irrealis clauses, nor in presuppositions; (ii) when the claimed fact is directly observable by both speaker and hearer, evidentials are rarely used (or have a special emphatic or surprisal sense); and (iii) when the speaker (first person) was a knowing participant in some event (voluntary agent; conscious experiencer), the knowledge of that event is normally direct and evidentials are then often omitted'. All these points are highly arguable — evidentials in some systems may be used in 'irrealis' clauses (depending on how the interactions between mood and modality, and evidentials, work in a particular language: see §8.3 below on the use of evidentials with conditional and irrealis in various languages); and the obligatoriness of evidentials depends on the particular system rather than on randomly chosen parameters such as (ii) and (iii). In Tuyuca (Barnes 1984) the evidentials are never omitted, whether the speaker is the 'knowing participant' or not. Finally, the last criterion 'second person in questions is treated as first person in statements', that is, a conjunct/disjunct (or locutor versus nonlocutor) distinction in person marking, is not at all necessarily linked to evidentiality (see §7.1-2).

De Haan (1997, ms, 1999) also offers criticism of Anderson's approach. However, the criteria which De Haan himself considers definitional hardly score any better (for instance, he

states that 'evidentials do not show agreement with the speaker' and that they 'cannot be in the scope of negation').

Wierzbicka's (1994, 1996: 427-58) treatment of evidentiality (based on a reinterpretation of the limited data published in Chafe and Nichols (1986)) is both misguided and simplistic. She defines evidentials through semantic 'primitives', such as 'know', whose universality is dubious. Thus, she is defining a grammatical category through lexical means (which are lacking from languages both with and without evidentiality). Contrary to Boas (1938: 133 quoted at the beginning of this section), she also does not make a distinction between evidentiality as a closed grammatical system and a lexical means of expressing meanings somehow related to 'source of knowledge'.

¹³ As, for instance, is the case with 'evidentiality' in Dutch argued for by De Haan (1997).

¹⁴ The analysis is cast in terms of basic linguistic theory, the fundamental typological theoretical apparatus 'that underlies all work in describing languages and formulating universals about the nature of human language', where 'justification must be given for every piece of analysis, with a full train of argumentation' (Dixon 1997: 132; see also Dixon 1994: xvi).